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Recent worldwide financial crisis puts local governments under sever stress to 
change and reshaped their strategy, attitude and commitments to citizens in order to 
control spending patterns. Cutting-back services, breaking contracts, rethinking welfare 
and additional austerity measures are a worldwide path that local governments follow to 
handle financial adversities. In this trouble times, although keeping in mind the need to 
ensure the basic conditions for local government to perform its functions and the capacity 
to implement them, several actors struggle to reshape urban governance, according to 
their preferences (Pierre 1999). Political parties, unions and interest groups are joined by 
engaging citizens and aggressive media to build new forms of social ties (Clark 2000). 
The way in which rules, values and behaviors are established can alternate the 
equilibrium between the elements of urban governance forcing a change in kind and 
nature. Oscillations occur in a democracy-efficiency continuum promoting four 
alternative forms of urban governance: autocratic efficiency, democratic inefficiency, 
democratic efficiency and autocratic inefficiency (Waldo & Miller 1948; DiGaetano & 
Strom 2003; Norris 2012). 
The goal of this paper is to analyze the different divers that constrain the settings 
of urban governance. The paper claims that urban governance is the grass root for a 
compatible combination among civic engagement, political responsiveness and efficient 
mechanisms of service delivery. The main hypothesis of the paper suggests an optimal 
level of democracy translated into an invert U-shape relation between democracy and 
efficiency. 
Using a quantitative approach, the paper collects data from all Portuguese local 
government and builds two set of indexes to test the hypothesis. Findings confirm the 
supported argument and contribute to some clarification on the interaction between 
democratic procedures, and managerial initiatives to achieve higher standards of 
democracy.  
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The idea of trade-off between democracy and efficiency goes back to Waldo’s work 
(1948) and it’s a recurrent topic in academic works albeit shaped under different covers. 
It has been called as a tension between technical knowledge and peoples’ will, between 
discretionary power and legitimacy or an altercation between bureaucracy and civic 
culture or yet, a trade-off between local voice to diversity, accountability and political 
responsiveness and a premium concern with structural efficiency (Overeem 2008; 
Dollery 2010).  
  Basically the argument is the same, politics and administration are two parts of 
the same world that imposes hard restrictions on each other but need to be balanced as 
two sides of the same coin (Waldo & Miller 1948; Svara 2008). The argument believes 
that increasing the size of democracy will undermine the ability to act efficiently. The key 
difference between sides relies on the decision making process. While administration 
efficiency relies on the discretional power of bureaucrats and their expertise, democracy 
rater trust on popular judgment. Ultimately, the former believes on the ability of technical 
knowledge to deliver an efficient outcome whereas the later tend to enroll popular 
legitimacy of decision. 
  In times of financial distress, the pressure for managerial efficiency is 
overwhelming. Although difficult, if not impossible by definition, to imagine a 
democratic system striped of elections, party competition and active civic participation, 
the fact is that this democratic system is at the edge of a financial breakdown that 
challenge the ability of governing structures to comply with their mission. The need to 
balance public finances and control the size of public debt makes it easy to consider civic 
participation and active citizenship as disposable, or at least a non-mandatory procedure. 
Bureaucrats use the argument “that people can´t eat democracy” (Norris 2012) and need 
an administration that takes accurate and timely decisions. They believe that the 
legitimacy of their decisions comes from its technical superiority instead of popular 
approval. However, at least three remarks can be made to this argument. One is that 
bureaucrat decision making process can also be capture by interest group, losing its 
ability to comply with the common good. Second, decisions tend to be too much focus on 
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technical aspects and devoid of any social sensitivity, having the risk to jeopardize social 
cohesion. Third, as a consequence of their alienation, citizen find hard to comply with 
public decisions. 
This classical argument of a trade-off between democracy and efficiency has been 
tested by several academics, in numerous contexts. After comparing countries and 
political regimes Gasiorowski (2000) claim that democracy tends to lead to higher 
inflation rates and slower economic growth, due to larger fiscal deficits. Besley et al.  
(2006) achieved to establish a positive relation between democracy, health and welfare. 
Skelcher (2007) focuses on mechanisms of participation as a way to measure democracy 
and advocate a direct relation between accurate levels of civic participation and 
organizational performance. While most works look to the effect of democracy on 
performance, Vigoda (2002) seeks to assess the opposite. His work confirms the direct 
and indirect effects of different levels of public sector performance on civic engagement. 
Recently some works focuses on an alternative approach using the combination of 
democracy and efficiency. Evidence of such was found in Australian structural reform of 
municipality’s consolidation. While Boyne (1992)argued the need to focus on democracy 
contrasting to the Aulich (2005)efficiency believes, Soul and Dollery work supports the 
view of a no trade-off between local democracy and efficiency(2010). More recently, the 
work of Norris (Norris 2012), based on a unified theory, stated that democratic 
governance can boost prosperity, welfare and peace in developing countries.  
  This paper contribution to the literature relies on the approach to this issue 
combining two dichotomy approaches. Waldo (1948) and Norris (2012)argue a linear 
relation between democracy and efficiency, where both are mutually exclusive. Waldo 
argument goes on with the major drawbacks that democratic procedures represent to 
efficiency objectives that is, increments in democratic measure will challenge the ability 
of managerial decision to be efficient. Whereas Norris arguments acts in the opposite 
direction stating that increases in democratic measure will drive government to higher 
efficiency standards. Combining the two arguments, this paper argues a non-linear 
relation between democracy and efficiency. Thus, increases in the degree of democracy 
will endorse higher levels of efficiency until a moment where additional democracy will 
undermine efficiency standards. Urban governance is the key factor that enables a 
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plausible equilibrium between democracy and efficiency, by boosting social capital, 
ensuring institutional structures and appropriate governance agreements to service 
delivery urban governance can ensure transparency, control, civic voluntary compliance, 
ie, assures democracy responsiveness along with efficiency standards. In this sense, this 
research employs data from Portuguese municipal governments to address the effect of 
democracy on efficiency. Using the indexes of democracy and efficiency the paper 
suggests that there is an optimal level of democracy translated into an invert U-shaped 
relationship between the index of democracy and the index of efficiency.  
  Using tobit regression the paper’s hypothesis was tested the relation between 
indexes and found evidences that the relation between democracy, and efficiency is non-
linear and has an invert U-shape.  
This paper is organized as follows. First, the paper introduces the literature on 
urban governance as the setting pieces between democracy and efficiency. Then the paper 
presents the interaction among them. Section two discusses the operationalization of 
democracy and efficiency indexes. Section three describes the research context which is 
followed by the section of the data and methods employed in the empirical analyses. The 
findings are discussed in section five. The article closes with the conclusions and policy 
implications of this investigation. 
 
URBAN GOVERNANCE 
Urban governance is the playground where democracy meets efficiency. Urban 
governance can be analyzed through structural, cultural and rational glances (DiGaetano 
& Strom 2003). The structural approach sees it as a market interaction of governmental 
power and private resources. Cultural perspective includes a broader range of actors in a 
new political culture. Political parties, unions and organized groups are replaced by 
citizens, media and outside expertize and urban governance is the place where they 
exchange values and create social ties (Clark 2000). Rational perspective, grounded on 
public choice and regime theory, conceives it as informal arrangements by which public 
bodies and private interests function together in order to be able to make and carry out 
governing decisions (DiGaetano & Strom 2003). Despite some differences, an integrative 
perspective defines urban governance as a coalition process of community based actors to 
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consolidate a collective strategy about local economy and social development (Bramwell 
2012; Laurila 2004; Stone 1993). It is a process through which authorities, in concert 
with private interest, seek to enhance collective goals. It is shaped by political, economics 
and social values that confer legitimacy to political choices and ensure state capacity to 
comply (Pierre 1999:374). The overall objective of urban governance is to achieve two 
main goals: to ensure the basic conditions for local government to perform its functions 
and, secondly, to ensure local government the capacity to implement the needed public 
policy. 
The way in which rules, values and behaviors are established can shape urban 
governance in kind and nature. Pierre (1999) argues that urban governance shape shift 
from managerial to corporatist, progrowth and welfare depending on their objectives, 
participants, instruments and outcomes. DiGeetano and Strom (2003) propose five modes 
of governance: clientelistic, corporatist, managerial, pluralist and populist based on 
governing relation, logic, key players and political objectives. Acknowledging the 
differences between above models, all classifications respond to Waldo’s argument of a 
trade-off between democracy and efficiency and can be joined up in two large and wide 
groups, as presented in table 1. 
[Table 1 here] 
  The two groups represent the extremes of a democracy-efficiency continuum. 
Local governments are expected to accomplish this two opposite functions: to voice local 
aspirations; and to provide a mechanism for efficient service delivery (Dollery 2010). As 
such, an urban governance that follows the path of democracy, seeking deeper integration 
and sharing power with citizens, will lose, along the way, the ability to be efficient. 
Oscillations between the kinds of urban governance vary with the intensity in which each 
element is felt and needed (Hendriks & Tops 2002). No democracy can survive if the 
government does not have capacity to ensure the basic set of rules and public services. 
However, no expectations of prosperity are sustainable if strip of popular engagement and 
legitimacy (Thomas & Memon 2007). Thus, urban governance is traditionally understood 
as a search for as equilibrium between the trade-offs of democracy and efficiency. 
Schumpeter (2010) defines democracy using a very minimalist notion. Following 
his definition, democratic regimes are those governments elected under a competitive 
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election. The definition is not incorrect but the truth is that it is the thinness notion of 
democracy. To be faithful to this notion one must assume that all democratic regimes are 
equal since they all are the result of an electoral process. However, it may be hard to cope 
with this idea when comparing regimes inclusive of citizen’s opinions with ones that 
confine the civic interaction to the electoral process at the end of each term. It is, at least, 
awkward to argue that, in this case, we are facing the same kind of democracy. At least, 
two additional layers of democracy can be identified besides the competitive multiparty 
system election. One is the direct democracy. That is, a democracy that seeks to establish 
a frequent link to its community to enroll citizens in political process as a way to increase 
legitimacy of the political decisions (Yang & Callahan 2007; Knutsen 2010; Handley & 
Howell Moroney 2010). Another level deals with the institutional agreement to avoid 
asymmetric information. The role that media play is a basilar essence of democracy. 
Their action promotes the dissemination of information within a competitive multiparty 
system making accountability increase over political decision.  
  Three major positive outcomes can be drawn from the effects of democracy on 
efficiency. A democratic system close to citizens will provide an accurate representation 
of constituents’ preferences and attitudes (Copus 2003). Political competition drives 
politicians to good performance since it is a mechanism of punishment that identifies and 
eliminates incompetent agents. Finally, democracy brings transparency and 
accountability to political decision-making and implementation. Accountability will make 
elected officials more responsive to citizen’s demands in a vote-seeking perspective 
(Norris 2012), while transparency gives citizens a better judgment over political actions. 
Adam et al. (2011) argue that civic engagement and governmental transparency control 
political opportunism of increase budget slack in the production of public goods. 
  However, democracy has also some drawbacks to efficiency. Being responsive to 
citizens and allowing them to fully accomplish their preferences, may have unbearable 
consequences to the best interest of all. Each citizen tends to overlook their preferences 
claiming their importance over the others. Each will be motivated to ask for more 
services increasing overall spending but internalizing only part of the cost, in a pork 
barrel strategy (Weingast et al. 1981). Elected official, in a vote-seeking strategy, will be 
tempted to comply. This may lead to a situation of financial unsustainability that they will 
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have to solve. However, political agents find hard to approve and comply with bills that 
impose restrictions on themselves and on their electoral support (Gasiorowski 2000). 
Political agenda also play a major role damaging efficiency. The foundation of political 
cycles (Nordhaus 1975) and median-voter (Downs 1957) arguments work in the same 
direction, that elected officials have a specific and very own meaning of efficiency driven 
by political self-interest issues rather than economic and financial ones. 
  Excessive expenditures, painful tax levels and mistrust in elected officials 
stressed the need to focus on a scheme to pull efficiency in public services (Pierre 2009). 
Urban management’s orientation is pushed forward to the concern of financial issues. 
Reform agenda tend to adopt strategies to reduce fiscal stress at any cost, even if it means 
to reduce the level civic participation on the decision-making process. The managerial 
approach comes to dominate democratic dimension since it believes that no significant 
cuts will be possible without some restrictions being placed on the ability of residents to 
participate in these decisions. Efficiency gains become an imperative to avoid fiscal stress 
and to prevent public entities to run out of money. Otherwise the consequences of a 
financial breakdown could spread over and have a contagious effect jeopardizing the 
ability of public agents to provide the needed services to citizens. Efficiency is perused 
by two alterative strategies: rather it focus on in-house management improvement 
solutions, rather it trusts third party capacities using externalization of services. As a 
result of the first strategy, gains can be obtained in government efficiency and financial 
sustainability. However, the major issue is that we need to believe that bureaucrat 
knowledge and decision match civic needs and will, which is not necessarily truth. The 
efficient decision may not be the not supported by citizens. If the bureaucrat’s call is 
follow, one can raise serious doubts about the legitimacy and accountability of the 
process. Democracy holds politician responsible for their decisions but this procedure is 
devoid of any real use if the actual decision maker stays on the sidelines. Alternative 
strategy is the externalization of service delivery, which is also committed with some 
flaws. The reform agenda embrace the adoption of managerial initiatives but moves 
discretionary powers away from legitimate governments to unelected institutions. 
Advocates of Public Choice theory may argue that services still are accountable to 
citizens by the use of market mechanism where they voice their preferences, however this 
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is a performance accountability only, not one of procedure (Pierre 2009:602).   
Urban Governance Combination’s 
This paper argues the possibility of an alternative model of urban governance. The 
central argument of the paper is that urban governance can also promote a combination 
that fall outside the linear continuum democracy-efficiency. It upholds a kind of 
governance inclusive to citizens without jeopardizing the government capacity to foresee 
their goals. The objective is to enhance performance in public services, as well as 
assuring voice to citizen. Decision making process includes, citizens, groups, local 
government, mass media and political parties and local governments manage 
community’s welfare through a pluralist network. Expected outcomes are higher levels of 
financial sustainability allied with larger popular legitimacy of political choices and 
increased accountability. Summing up, urban governance, within democratic efficiency 
scope, is the setting pieces and the equilibrium that improves legitimacy of choices, 
transparency in procedures, accountability in rule setting as well as shared power, 
responsibility and efficiency. In other words, the will of citizens and the community best 
interests implemented in the most accurate and financially sustainable way. 
The paper’s argument assumes that the democracy-efficiency continuum is 
replaced by a combination of two axes. Vertical axis represents the degree in which urban 
governance focus on efficiency and horizontal axis the degree in which democracy plays 
a key role in the setting of rules, behaviors and objectives. All possible combinations 
between democracy and efficiency are represented in table 2.  
[Table 2 here] 
  On the upper right and down left quadrants are the expressions of Waldo’s 
argument. In an Autocratic Efficiency public officials focus on bureaucratic expertize and 
on the state capacity to deliver services. A strategy of civic avoidance is implemented to 
uphold the faculty of decision making grounded on financial/economic criteria rather than 
political ones. On the opposite side, the Democratic Inefficiency is a situation where 
officials are capture by citizens and interest groups and are unable to perform as well as 
in the previous situation. Decisions tend to do the best for each individual damaging the 
welfare of the community. The Autocratic Inefficiency is, by far, a situation to be 
avoided. Striped of any restrains imposed by democratic procedures, discretionary power 
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gets capture by particular interests and drift away from roots of efficiency. The 
Democratic Efficiency a result of a combination between political competition, 
mechanisms of civic participation and share access to information, that leads to 
transparency and accountability, and the aggregation of agents’ skill, leading to accurate 
service delivery and financial sustainability. That is, a stage where a community strength 
simultaneously inclusive voice to citizen and government capacity to manage and oversee 
service delivery.  
 
LEGITIMATION, TRANSPARENCY AND CONTROL 
Democracy is a key element to government. It provides legitimacy to the ones that are 
chosen to act in behalf of the common good and it ensure a system were they will hold 
accountable for their decisions.  
The definition of democracy and the way that it can be measure it is a matter of no 
consensus between academics. Surely if we trusts on Schumpeter’s (1976) way to define 
democracy as an institutional arrangement for arriving at political decision in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote, it is relatively simple and easy to measure since it is based on electoral 
mechanisms. However the understanding of democracy changed over the years. The 
simple fact of having an electoral process is not sufficient to ensure the true essence of 
democracy, ie, the popular control over politics (Beetham 1999). If so, democracy would 
cease to a variable to become a constant in every country. The understanding of a system 
where one have the power of the people to act for the people gave place to a situation 
where one have the formal power of the people and uses involvement initiatives with the 
community for targeting problems and solving them (Haus & Klausen 2011). The 
legitimacy to hold a political office becomes separated from the legitimacy of using its 
powers. The first is acquired with electoral process while the second is a constant process 
of civic enrollment. As such, democracy varies in intensity and the literature provides a 
range of alternative indexes to measure it.  
Freedom House Index (FHI) (House 2011) is, among academics, a wide spread 
way to measure democracy. FHI is highly connected to the first conception of democracy 
and it plays a particular attentions to electoral process and the presence of democratic 
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institutions (Knutsen 2010). FHI scores countries based on Civil Liberties and Political 
Rights. The first is used to assess the freedom of association, assembly and belief as well 
as to gauge the power of the rule of law. The second is used to measured fairness of 
electoral process, the existence of an opposition and the levels of corruption. 
Effective Democracy Index (EDI) rather stresses the importance to measure substantive 
democracy, that is, the actual functioning of democratic institutions (Inglehart & Welzel 
2005). EDI is composed by de Democratic Right Index (DRI) and the Rule of Law Index 
(RLI). DRI measures private and public freedoms and participation rights. RLI measure 
how strictly government agents abide by the laws (Alexander et al. 2012).    
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of Democracy (Economist 2010)sores 
democracy by the combination of 60 dichotomous and three-points scoring grouped in 
five units of analysis: Electoral Process and Pluralism, to assess the competitiveness and 
fairness of the electoral process; Functioning of Government, to gauge the independence 
and accountability of the government; Political Participation, to measure the citizens’ 
engagement with politics; Democratic Political Culture, to weigh the perception of the 
people regarding the democratic process; Civil Liberties, to capture the freedom of 
association and expression.  
Political IV establishes a three elements evaluation to classify democracy. 
Executive Recruitment figures out the origin and freedom of the political power. 
Executive Constraints assesses the institutional mechanisms to control political powers. 
Political Participation is used to measure accuracy and fairness of the electoral process. 
However these indexes are built to be use at national level. The adaptation to local 
government must consider the responsibilities trusted to this tier of government as well as 
its limitations and differences. For the purpose of the paper, democracy will be assessed 
through the evaluation of three elements: Electoral Competition and Pluralism; Civic 
Participation; Political Culture and Civic Liberties.    
Electoral competition and pluralism are the check and balance that holds officials 
accountable for their actions. Competition increases accountability, transparency and 
concern for the citizens’ need. A highly competitive election will drive officials to 
assume a vote-seeking strategy to avoid losing next election. Sa a consequence 
politicians, driven by their basic survival instincts, will provide the proposals that better 
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suite citizens interests to gain their preference (Downs 1957). Besides the emphasis on 
citizens’ needs, competition also increases transparency. In search of popular support 
politicians will be forced to show how trustworthy and reliable they are. The fact is that 
competition also plays a roll on the loosing side. Motivated by the possibility to get in 
office, opposition is motivated to increase their supervision over political choices to make 
officials accountable for their actions. Ultimately, a highly competitive electoral process 
is driven by the same forces of those of a regular market: the costumer’s choices will 
decide who wins or loose.  As long as the competition intensity decreases officials’ 
accountability towards citizens fades away since they become more reliant on their 
electoral strength and legitimacy. Side by side with competitiveness, pluralism plays an 
important role in the intensity of democracy. Pluralism in governing bodies assures the 
accurate representation of the constituents’ preferences (Copus 2003). An excessive focus 
on the median voter’s preferences may result on a tyranny of the democratic 
majority(Weimer & Vining 2010). In this situation, the indirect democratic mechanisms 
will fail their mission to represent the trust and the sovereignty of the people.  
The second element used to measure democracy is civic participation. Scholars 
argue that it can lead to more information, better decisions and, ultimately, more effective 
democracy (Irvin & Stansbury 2004; Lowndes et al. 2001). For some time civic 
participation was mistakenly reduced to the expression of voter turnout in city election. 
This understanding has an enormous flaw and fails to cope with the idea of a market-
based model of service delivery. It lies on a traditional institution of democratic 
accountability. It believes that popular control through voting in city election is enough to 
held officials accountable, assuming that officials have effective control over service 
delivery when, after the managerial reform, actually, they do not. The use of alternative 
governance arrangements imposes changes on the institutional design to provide 
transparency, accountability and legitimacy (Pierre 2009). In this way civic participation 
is used to improve process legitimation sustaining political decisions and providing 
fairness, equity and honesty (J. C. Thomas 2010; Van Ryzin 2011).  
Civic Participation can be understood in two different ways. First it entails 
legitimacy to government decision through the use of political mechanism, provided by 
local governments, to improve the degree of political responsiveness by securing citizen’s 
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rights to information on policy alternatives and a role in the policy decision making 
process (Cope 1997). Examples of such mechanisms are local referendum, participatory 
budget, public hearings, study circles and informal meetings (Hug & Tsebelis 2002; 
Hamel 1998). Still, the use of such instruments depends on the mayors’ commitment and 
willingness to support citizen participation. Mayors that value citizen voice and display 
concerns for the public interest and social equity are also expected to devote more time 
and efforts into making participatory tools available to the community (Yang & Callahan 
2007; Handley & Howell Moroney 2010). Second, it increases the link between citizens 
and their community. Democracy also comes from the way in which people feel 
connected to their neighborhood and are willing to engage their problems. Individuals 
may choose to invest time and resources to embrace common problems. This choice is 
regardless of any mayor’s judgment to allow the use of participatory mechanism and 
represents the expression of direct democracy, where the people take mater into own 
hands to decide and implement the needed policies. Civic participation can be capture 
besides the use of political tools of participation, namely by the action of voluntary and 
non-profit organization (Tavares & Carr 2012).  
Last element is political culture and civic liberties. The supporting argument is 
that political profile of citizens shape local democracy. Communities where citizens have 
high political profiles are expected to have more responsive officials. Citizens become 
more self-aware of official’s responsibilities and are more demanding for accountability. 
Yang and Callahan(Yang & Callahan 2007) find evidence that this high political culture 
is found in communities with higher education levels. Political culture also reflects the 
extension of political freedom in communities. Political freedom is a demanding concept 
grounded on liberal democracy and supports basic human rights such as the freedom of 
speech, expression and the press; freedom of religion; freedom of assembly and 
association; and the right to due judicial process (Economist 2010). The availability and 
use of popular rights entitle people to make their own choices in individual matters and to 
have their choices count in collective matters (Alexander et al. 2012:42). Sherrod et. al. 
(2010) argue that political participation, at the local level, must be seen as a dynamic 
process where the desire to participate, regardless of its format, results from 
communication and information that favors community integration. However, high 
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political profile and liberal democracy are meaningless without the rule of law to enforce 
them. As stated, the rule of law is the extension of which democratic rights and liberties 
are imposed over officials’ behavior. It reflects the assurance that rules and law will 
override any attempt to manipulate democratic practices.  
EFFICIENT GOVERNMENT 
Although the importance of democracy, public services must comply with efficiency 
demands to avoid situations of financial stress, which can ultimately lead to bankruptcy, 
and to ensure their ability to respond to citizens’ need for public services. The focus on 
public sector performance became relevant with the New Public Management (NPM) 
reform agenda (Hood 1991) and, despite all efforts, still is an unconscious concept.  
Efficiency is one of most worked and defined concepts in management literature. 
It describes the extents in which effort and cost are used for an intended task or purpose. 
Efficiency is also described by the most adequate relationship between outputs and the 
necessary resource to obtain them (Camões et al. 2007). The search for efficiency was at 
the heart of most traditional works in administrative sciences since the early days of 
Taylor’s Principles of Scientific Management (Taylor 1911). Economic crises and the 
increasing problems to control public expenditures increased the interest in the issue for 
public sector efficiency. The focus is to make the better use of taxpayer’s money 
maximizing the relation between inputs and outputs (Camões et al. 2007).  
  Reform agenda targeted public service institutional transformation favoring the 
creation of autonomous operative agencies or using private sector agents through 
contracting-out or/and privatization. Although following different paths, bought strategies 
aim to increase operative capacity retrieving any bureaucratic barrier to public sector 
efficiency (Pollitt 2004). The creation of agencies is part of a consolidated strategy to 
economize spending restore trust on public services and increase quality of public 
services(Pollitt et al. 2001). The fragmentation of large and amorphous unites into single-
purpose organizations allow the clarification of a core business that guides to a higher 
focus, specialization and expertize. Agencies are more self-aware of their mission, 
objectives and purpose and are easily accountable by a set of performance indicators to a 
system of audits and inspections, and quality assessment that emerges as a natural to 
replacement of the direct control of in-house production (Julnes & Holzer 2001). 
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Separating out agencies, relaxed from public regulation, become more flexible, 
manageable and more responsive to publics’ and environmental demands. Disaggregation 
goes beyond structural dimension and moves to functional dimension separating policy 
making and implementation. The distancing of agencies from political gameplay 
encourage a more professional approach to management (Elston 2013; Christensen & 
Lægreid 2006). Privatization is an alternative solution, mostly to more commercial 
services, to improve public sector performance. The potential of using private markets for 
public services includes the cost saving behaviors induced by competition and the purge 
of potential political rents, budget maximization and perverse incentives of public 
bureaucracies (Hefetz & Warner 2011). As such, reform agenda tend to consider market 
solutions as more efficient than hierarchic mechanisms. It is based on a strong 
assumption that the market can maximize efficiency throughout better coordination 
between assets and labor (Hood 1994; Kettl 2005; Stein 1993; Osborne & Gaebler 1993; 
Ferris & Graddy 1998). Overall strategy focus on gathering executive authority away 
from political judgment to service delivery structures steered by a public-choice-style 
market-like exchanges that maximize citizen’s preferences purging, at the same time, 
excessive and inefficient production (Pollitt & Bouckaert 2011). 
  Beside the overall assumption of efficiency through governance agreement 
grounded on externalization and market-type mechanism, several academic works focus 
on appraising the effective measurement of public sector efficiency. Some problems may 
be raised from applying the concept of efficiency to public sector. The origins of the 
concept are grounded in the private sector, based on the necessity to find a ration between 
weighted outputs and weighted inputs (Afonso & Fernandes 2008). Public services 
outputs are hardly measured in prices that reflect the costs of their inputs or market fails 
to give prices to services of not for profit nature. Despite this drawback, some technics 
are used to measure service efficiency without requiring the definition of weights. Non-
parametric estimations can derive efficiency scores, based on a production function 
frontier, on the bases of relative distances of inefficient observation from the frontier 
(Afonso & Fernandes 2008; Moore et al. 2005). Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and 
Free Disposal Hull (FDH) are the most recurrent methodologies used to assess public 
sector efficiency/performance (De Borger & Kerstens 1996; Gonzalez et al. 2011; Rogge 
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& De Jaeger 2012; Afonso & Fernandes 2008). DEA had become widely used, along 
with it extension Value Efficiency Analysis (VEA), seeking to draw a production frontier 
and to asses relative efficiency by the comparison of data on inputs and outputs of 
productive units. 
  In this paper efficiency of local government will be assessed using three 
elements: state capacity; service delivery; and staff quality. State capacity deals with the 
necessity to have a government that as the ability to build and sustain the proper 
institutional roots, such as property rights, rule of law, control of corruption and 
regulatory quality, for economic and social development (Kaufmann et al. 2010; Stiglitz 
& undefined author 1989). Financial crises triggered environmental entropy that 
threatened this capacity. Governments found themselves unable to comply with situations 
of fiscal stress and were forced to evaluate the scope of government, to initiate an era of 
cutback management and streaming businesslike process (Scorsone & Plerhoples 2010). 
To assure a sustainable and well-functioning government financial aspect stressing the 
value for money and the need of doing more with less become the major issue in the 
political agenda. The tools of efficiency rely over revenue increase, expenditures cuts, 
hiring freeze and cancellation of planned infrastructure projects that oversize local 
economy(Anderson 2011).  
Managerial reform change the institutional design of service delivery (Ostrom & 
Ostrom 1978). The roles had been sated «Incorrect Verb Form:  Singular subjects always 
take singular verbs.» a political power were confined to the control and overview of 
services delivery whereas market-base solution were promoted as responsible to service 
provision (Osborne & Gaebler 1993). Public choice approach supports the argument of 
efficient service delivery using market like situation where citizens, as costumers, are 
empowered to articulate their preferences (Brown et al. 2006; Ferris 1986; Stein 1993).  
Finally, the third aspect is linked with the capacity of the bureaucracy to ensure 
impartiality with regards to effectiveness, legality, efficiency, ethics and integrity. A very 
traditional notion of efficiency grounded on Weber’s (1924) idea of a group of non-
elected officials that carried out their mission upon a rational legitimacy of rules.  
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RESEARCH CONTEXT 
Local government in Portugal is structured in two layers: municipalities and parishes. The 
later are smaller jurisdiction, highly fragmented and less powerful with few own 
competencies then the former. Over the years, central government followed the path of 
progressive decentralization increasing the degree of autonomy of municipalities. Today, 
they are responsible to deliver much of the everyday services to citizens, such as energy, 
water, garbage disposal, transports, education, health, housing, leisure, civil protection 
and municipal police. 
  Most recent financial crises put local governments under stress threatening their 
ability to comply with their responsibilities and, as such, the welfare of their constituents.  
Therefore, municipalities were under serious stress to increase efficiency and obtain 
financial sustainability at all cost. As an additional factor, the adversities of the external 
environment characterized by a memorandum of understanding with the IMF, UE and 
ECB, that favors financial revenues over every other values. Therefore, reform initiatives 
rather focus on financial aspect and revenues maximization. Financial aspects of 
Portuguese municipalities are strictly formalized in the Local Finance Act.   
  Municipal income sources vary between one of four alternatives: Municipal 
taxes, collected by central government and transferred to local authorities, they charge 
real estate and its transition, vehicle tax, and a surcharge on corporate income; Fees, 
prices of municipal services directly collected by municipalities; Central Government 
transfers, resulting from the reallocation of income taxes and Value Added Taxes that are 
collected from central government; Loans, credits obtained by the municipality among 
private banks. The Local Finance Act regulates all municipal revenues and it is where we 
can also find two additional forms of financial support only to be use in case of fiscal 
stress: the municipal financial restructuring and the municipal financial rebalancing. The 
first is an instrument triggered by the local government and it consists on a loan, given by 
the central government, to reschedule debt and consolidates financial liabilities. The 
second, can be triggered both by local government or central government if one of two 
conditions exists1. If financial stress is reported the municipality must elaborate a 
                                                
1 Debts over 50% of last year revenues and debts, overdue by three month, related to social security, civil 
servant wages, leasing contracts. 
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containing plan specifying every measure that needs to be undertaken to ensure long term 
financial sustainability. The local government is then authorized to contract a 20 year 
loan (maximum). Throughout this time, elected officials loose some of their 
independence and freedom regarding to central government. Hiring personal and public 
procurement is now under the direct judgment of central government.  
  More recently, the Local Financial Act has been the center of an intended 
reformulation. The central government is proposing the creation of an instrument similar 
to the Emergency Managers (see Scorsone (2010), Mears (2012) and Anderson (2011)). 
The idea is to ensure a central government specific credit to Municipalities in fiscal stress 
and, in exchange, to have the ability to appoint a city manager to control the use of the 
money.  
    
DATA AND METHODS 
This research addresses two questions. First, what is the outcome that democracy 
has over efficiency? Second, can urban governance set an equilibrium between efficiency 
and democracy? In order to answer these questions, we analyze data from the 278 local 
governments of Continental Portugal in an attempt to test the link between efficiency, 
measured by capital expenditures and the annual investment plan, and the density of 
democratic representation. 
The paper argues of an invert U-shaped relationship between democracy and 
efficiency. Increasing the levels of democracy will, initially, drive to higher standards of 
efficiency. More democracy assures a more accurate representation of the constitutes’ 
preferences at the same time that it increases political competition enhancing 
transparency and accountability which as a positive effect on efficiency. However, a 
turning point can be reached where elected officials tend to overlook their preferences 
assuming a pork barrel and vote logrolling strategies. In this situation, democratic 
procedures, where each agent is looking to maximize their welfare, lead to public finance 
decisions that have no other outcome than the overspending and lower levels of 
efficiency. 
The main argument of the paper can be tested by the following hypothesis: 
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H1: Efficiency of local governments has an inverted-U shape relation with the 
level of democracy 
  The paper uses three models to test its argument. The firsts model is used to test 
the linear relation between efficiency and democracy. The second model use a second 
degree function, the democracy index and its square, to assess the non-linear relation with 
efficiency. And the third model is used to test the consistency of the second model, after 
the addition of control variables that measure the economical background of each local 
government.   
Our model can be represented by:  
Efficiency Index = αα  + ββ1 (Democracy Index)  + µ                                  [1] 
 
Efficiency Index =α+ββ1(Democracy Index)+ββ2(Democracy Index2)+µ                        [2] 
 
Efficiency Index = αα  + ββ1 (Democracy Index) + ββ2 (Democracy Index2) + ββ3 
ln(Income) + ββ4 ln(unemployment) + ββ5 ln(Real-estate transactions) + µµ                                
[3] 
 
Efficiency index is used as the dependent variable. The efficiency level of each 
local government is gauge by the combination of three variables: state capacity, service 
delivery and service quality. State capacity is assessed by the financial situation of each 
municipality. Two indicators are used to this effect: financial indebtedness and per capita 
financial autonomy. The argument is that efficiency will be higher if the municipalities 
have a lower level of financial indebtedness and higher levels of financial autonomy 
Financial indebtedness is estimated by the ration between the financial liabilities and 
assets while the per capita financial autonomy is obtained by the ration from the result of 
the subtraction of the financial liabilities and assets with the population of the local 
government. Both indicators are gathered from official financial data, from the year 2011, 
published by the National Office of the Local Administration (direção-geral das 
autarquias locais).  
To compute the efficiency index the paper also uses, as indicated, a service 
delivery variable. This variable is gauge by the level of externalization of municipal 
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services and the cost efficiency of processed services. Externalization is considered to be 
an indicator of a quest for more efficient levels of service delivery (Hood 1994; Kettl 
2005; Stein 1993; Osborne & Gaebler 1993; Ferris & Graddy 1986). Reform agenda 
traditionally assume that market solution can produce a better combination between 
financial resources and service output. Externalization level is estimated by the ratio of 
expenditures used in contracts and transferences to alternatives to in-house solutions of 
services delivery and the total of expenditures. The argument is that higher levels of 
externalization lead to better efficiency. Data was collected, for the year 2011, from the 
National Office of the Local Administration (direção-geral das autarquias locais). The 
second indicator is the cost efficiency of service delivery. «Incorrect Present Tense of 
Verb.» This indicator is measure using Data Envelopment Analysis that draws a 
production frontier and to asses relative efficiency by the comparison of data on inputs 
and outputs of municipalities. It is expected that higher levels of cost efficiency of service 
delivery represent better efficiency. Data was collected from Afonso and Fernandes 
(2008) list of efficiency throughout Portuguese municipalities. 
Third variable of efficiency index is service quality.  The paper uses two 
indicators to weigh service quality: productivity and staff qualification. Productivity is 
measured by the ratio of municipal gross added value (GAV) and the number of public 
servants. Staff qualification is gauge by the ration of public servants with an academic 
degree and the total number of public servants in a municipality. In both cases the paper 
argues that better productivity and more staff qualification lead to higher standards of 
efficiency. It is expected that per capita GAV represent an effort of each public servant to 
overall productivity, ie, to the municipal efficiency. The paper assumes that GAV 
increase will have a linear and positive behavior with the workforce qualification. Data 
was gathered from the National Bureau of Statistics and the National Office of the Local 
Administration. 
On the other hand democracy index was built using three variables: electoral 
competition and pluralism, civic participation and political culture. 
Electoral competition and pluralism were measured using three indicators: 
number of consecutive terms, voting difference between the winner and political 
fragmentation. The number of consecutive terms served by elected official is considered 
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to be a drawback to efficiency since it could damage the reliability on public policies to 
suite citizens interests. In the same way, the number of votes that separate winners and 
losers, in an electoral turnout, could reflect the competitive pressure to the elected official 
to focus on constituent’s preferences. As such, a close victory will enhance incumbents to 
be more accountable to their voters. The last indicator for political competitiveness is 
political fragmentation. This indicator is determined by the subtraction from 1 of the 
Hirscham-Herfindal index of concentration (2011). The argument is that a less 
concentrated executive2 will be better able to cover all the variety of preferences. Data for 
all three indicators were collected from the National Electoral Commission with reference 
to municipal executive election of 2009. 
Civic participation is the second variable used to measure democracy and it was 
assessed by: electoral participation and non-profit organizations. The electoral 
participation is gauge by the ration between the numbers of express voters and the 
number of total electors in the 2009 executive municipal election. Higher levels of 
participation are a proxy for a healthy democracy and civic engagement in the political 
process. Nevertheless, civic participation can be express outside political participation 
and can be measured be the number of non-profit organizations in each jurisdiction 
(Tavares & Carr 2012). Data related to de non-profit organization was gather by the 
registration in 2011 with the Social Security Financial Management Office of the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security. 
Last variable of the democracy index is the political culture that was measured by 
the number of newspapers published in each municipality and the degree of education in 
each jurisdiction. The paper’s argument in based on the assumption that the number of 
newspaper in a municipality will concur directly to the level of information and 
transparency and accountability. The degree of education is the proportion of the total 
resident population of the normal age group for attending an educational cycle that is 
actually attending that cycle. The belief is that an educated population will be more aware 
of their rights and will hold incumbents accountable for their actions. Both data were 
collected from the National Bureau of Statistics. 
                                                
2 Municipal executives in Portugal reflects the electoral turnout proportionality. That is, parties 
defeated in the electoral process are entitled to terms in municipal executive 
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Both indexes were built following the same methodology (Morris & McAlpin 
1982). For each indicator the paper establishes the worst and best value in a way that all 
the indexes became unidirectional and could be combined (Dholakia 2005). Each 
indicator is put in a 0 to 1 scale where 0 represents the observed worst score and 1 the 
observed best. Then indexes are properly weighted. For the purpose of this paper all 
indicators were equally weighted (0.5) but the non-profit organizations and the number of 
newspapers (0.25). This fact is due to the impossibility to separate among the non-profit 
organizations the ones that, although without the propose of profit, have a commercial 
nature. To what concerns the number of newspapers, we could separate the ones that are 
published in one jurisdiction but have a national range.   
[Insert table 3 here] 
The last model includes three control variables: income, unemployment and real-
estate transactions. The control variables are used as a proxy to capture the economical 
context of the local government. Per capita income (Income) should be positively related 
to efficiency since it gauge the capacity of citizens to pay for public services and is one of 
important municipal revues of the as an income tax over the population. Unemployment 
represents a typical indicator of less economical strength and should be negatively related 
to efficiency. Finally, real-estate transactions are a suitable indicator for economic 
performance at local level and it is expected to be positively related with the efficiency 
index. Real Estate is one of the most important sources of own revenues for 
municipalities. Municipality charge a price for the proper licensing house building, they 
also charge an annual tax for the ownership of the house, and a transactions tax in each 
selling occasion. All taxes are indexed to the house value.  
Table 4 presents summary statistics for all variables included in the analyses. 
[Insert table 4 here] 
Tobit regression is employed to estimate the models since dependent variable is 
censored in the left (0) and right (1) limits. Table 4 presents Tobit results for three 
different models. 
[Insert table 5 here] 
[Insert figure 1 here] 
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EMPIRICAL FINDINGS  
The overall results confirm the existence of a non-linear relation between 
democracy and efficiency. Although the simple model behaves as predicted by Waldo, 
the inclusion of a quadratic term will unveil a more complex relation.  Increments in 
democracy will induce improvements in efficiency «Incorrect Verb Form:  Singular 
subjects always take singular verbs.» until a point were higher levels of democracy will, 
actually, damage the later. 
Results in the figure 1 show a high concentration of municipalities in the fourth 
quadrant indicating a low level of efficiency and a high level of democracy in 80.14% of 
Portuguese local government. However, only 1.8% are on the extreme opposite. The rest 
is dispersed between the second and third quadrants. 6.14% in the one that represents 
high efficiency and high democracy and 12.27% in the quadrat for low efficiency and 
democracy. 
The first specification in Table 4, which test a simple and linear relation between 
efficiency and democratic indexes, points out, as suggested by a Waldo, a negative 
relation between them. Each additional point in democracy reduces the score in efficiency 
in 0.18. The second interaction, were a quadratic term is added to the simple regression, 
is consistent to the paper’s argument. Results indicate an invert U-shape relationship 
between the efficiency and democracy indexes. Solving the quadratic equation produces 
an estimated optimal level of democracy of 0.5 matching an optimal of 0.39 for 
efficiency. Given this result, 86% of Portuguese Municipalities are above the optimal 
level for democracy. 
The third specification in Table 4, which adds control variables to the previous 
interaction, shows consistent results to the previous ones and, consequently, with the 
papers arguments. Controlling the effect of income, unemployment and real-estate 
transactions in local economic context, results still show evidence of an invert U-shape 
relationship between the efficiency and democracy indexes. The control variables 
display, in some situations, coefficient signs consistent with our expectations. Income is 
positively related with local government efficiency although it misses statistical 
significance. Real-estate transactions are, as expected, positively related with local 
government efficiency.  
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CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
  The paper’s main objective was to add a new perspective on the literature that 
focus on the effect that democracy has on efficiency. Since Waldo’s work many 
academics focus on this topic analyzing the dilemma of public decisions that need to 
follow a path between satisfying peoples’ need or choosing the most cost efficient 
behavior regardless of peoples’ preferences. This paper contributes to this literature by 
upholding a non-linear relationship that develops between the democracy and efficiency 
indexes. 
  In times of financial stress this topic has a renew interest and reform agendas tend 
to focus on managerial and efficiency improvements at the cost of democratic values.  
Democracy can promptly be relegated to the underdog status because of the extreme 
fiscal distress that endorses cost efficient initiatives. 
Our findings have three major implications that need to be highlighted. First, the 
results show evidences that allow us to consider the invert U-shape relation between 
democracy and efficiency. It means that urban governance can be structure to maximize 
both values without falling automatically into a trade-off. The proper pieces can be seated 
to find equilibrium between institutional engagements to civic enrolment, pluralist and 
inclusive decision-making process and cost efficient and financial sustainability 
initiatives. 
Second, Portuguese local governments are mostly, 80.14%, in a democratic 
inefficiency kind of urban governance. This is a situation were public decision is capture 
by political agenda that compromise the levels of efficiency. Vote-seeking strategy, the 
natural tendency of citizen to overlook their preferences claiming their importance over 
the others and the difficulty of to approve and comply with bills that auto-impose 
restrictions on constituents’ welfare drive urban governance away from financial 
sustainability. Reform agenda will need to free decision making process away from local 
interest and base it on solid technical knowledge to avoid the risk of a general 
bankruptcy.     
Third, the Local Financial Act that proposes the creation of an Emergency 
Managers, to manage the specific credit given to municipalities by central government, in 
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situations was indicators of fiscal stress are triggered, can be a walkout from the 
democratic inefficiency. Managerial initiatives that forces economic and financial agenda 
can produce a positive effect and be an opportunity to bring balance in the equilibrium 
equation between democracy and efficiency. 
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Table 1 
 Models of Urban Governance 
Characteristics I II 
Objective Efficiency Democracy 
Decision Making Process Conflict Consensus 
Key Players State and Private State and Citizens 
Local Government relation with 






















   Source: Adaptation of Norris (Norris 2012) 
Table. 3 
VARIABLES Worst Best Formula 
Financial autonomy (per 
capita) 
0.0378 0.809 (0.809-V)          x100 
(0.809 - 0.0378) 
Financial Indebtedness  915.5 -6,695 (-6,695 -V)          x100 
(-6,695 – (-915.5)) 
Productivity 1.490 76.08 (76.08 -V)          x100 
(76.08 - 1.490) 
Staff qualification 0.0667 0.430 (0.430-V)           x100 
(0.430 - 0.0667) 
Electoral Participation  44.05 81.11 (81.11-V)          x100 
(81.11- 44.05) 
Voting difference 58.47 0.0400 (0.0400-V)          x100 
(0.0400- 58.47) 
Political fragmentation 0 0.678 (0.678-V)          x100 
(0.678- 0) 
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Non-profit organization 0 782 (782-V)          x100 
(782- 0) 
Number of terms 10 1 (1-V)          x100 
(1 - 10) 
Efficiency (DEA) 0 1 (1-V)          x100 
(1- 0) 
Externalization 0.157 0.806 (0.806-V)          x100 
(0.806- 0.157) 
Degree of Education 50.80 183.8 (183.8-V)          x100 
(183.8- 50.80) 




VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
      
Unemployment 278 0.0355 0.0131 0.0105 0.0895 
Democracy Index 277 0.591 0.0886 0.292 0.763 
Efficiency Index 278 0.373 0.0853 0.147 0.659 
Income (ln) 278 6.679 0.161 6.368 7.419 
Real-Estate  278 9.420 1.525 6.436 14.38 




 Simple Quadratic Complete 
VARIABLES model model model 
    
Democracy Index -0.1818*** 1.1090** 0.9719** 
 (0.0568) (0.5177) (0.4736) 
Democracy Index  -1.1478** -0.9700** 
(square)  (0.4577) (0.4186) 
Unemployment   0.6940* 
   (0.3536) 
Income (ln)   0.0281 
   (0.0342) 
Real-Estate    0.0199*** 
 Transmission (ln)   (0.0037) 
Constant 0.4808*** 0.1278 -0.2542 
 (0.0339) (0.1447) (0.2515) 
    
Observations 277 277 277 
LR Chi2 10.04 16.26 66.90 
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LogLikelihood 294.3 297.4 322.7 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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